Data storage

ABSTRACT

A data storage includes a part of functioning for, when data reading operation is carried out on a storage part storing data for a case where the data storage is handled in a predetermined manner, causing predetermined data different from target data to be read out instead of the target data.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to a data storage, and, in particular, toa data storage for which security can be effectively improved for storedinformation.

2. Description of the Related Art

Recently, leakage, robbery or such, of information to be protected, suchas personal information, confidential information or such, has taken anattention as a social problem. As a result, countermeasures are demandedfor various types of information processing apparatuses which handlesuch information to be protected.

Information to be protected may include, for example, information foridentifying a person, such as a residence, a name or such, informationapplied for personal authentication such as fingerprint, password orsuch.

Such information to be protected is for example stored in a memory or adata storage in an information processing apparatus. In such a case, anappropriate countermeasure against data leakage should be taken for thememory or the data storage.

Memories or data storages used in information processing apparatuses maybe roughly classified into two types, i.e., volatile memories andnonvolatile memories. The nonvolatile memories are configured such that,as well-known, stored data is held even without power supply.

Japanese Laid-open Patent Applications Nos. 5-88986, 2001-195307,11-328036, 10-320293, 9-16477, 2002-73422 and 2001-202167 discloserelated arts.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

For example, in a fingerprint authentication system as one example of asystem handling personal information as information to be protected,fingerprint information as personal information may be stored in such anonvolatile memory. When the nonvolatile memory is stolen, a seriousproblem may occur, i.e., leakage of personal information to beprotected.

As a method of protecting information to be protected, enciphering ofthe relevant information may be cited. However, in this method,deciphering may be made by an unauthorized person as a result of anenciphering algorithm being analyzed.

The present invention has been devised in consideration of this problem,and an object of the present invention is to provide a data storage forwhich, even when the data storage storing information to be protected isstolen, unauthorized use of the information to be protected can beeffectively prevented.

In order to achieve this object, according to the present invention, adata storage includes a semiconductor storage in which hot carriers areinjected in such a manner that stored data is erased when thesemiconductor storage is handled in a predetermined manner.

Alternatively, a data storage includes a part of functioning forresponding to data reading operation carried out on a storage partstoring data to cause predetermined data, different from target data, tobe read out instead of the target data.

In the former configuration, hot carriers are previously injected in asemiconductor storage, and, for example, a configuration may be madesuch that exposure of the semiconductor storage to outside light isprevented when the semiconductor storage is set in a proper state,while, when the semiconductor storage is removed from the proper statewithout a special concern, the semiconductor storage is exposed tooutside light, whereby stored data is erased by a function of the hotcarriers.

As a result, even with a simple configuration, stored data can bepositively erased automatically when the data storage is stolen or so(whereby the data storage is handled in the predetermined manner, i.e.,the data storage is removed without a special concern).

In the latter configuration, data different from target data can be madeto be read out when the data storage is stolen or so. In thisconfiguration, an unauthorized person may believe that he or sheobtained the target data even when actually different data is thus readout.

Thus, according to the present invention, when a data storage is stolenor so, stored data is automatically erased or different data is readout. As a result, unauthorized use of information to be protected can beeffectively prevented.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Other objects and further features of the present invention will becomemore apparent from the following detailed description when read inconjunction with the accompanying drawings:

FIG. 1 shows a principle diagram of the present invention;

FIG. 2 shows a conceptual diagram of first and second embodiments of thepresent invention;

FIG. 3 shows a circuit diagram of a data storage according to the firstembodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 4 shows a circuit diagram of a data storage according to the secondembodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 shows a work and operation flow chart illustrating a thirdembodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 6 shows a work and operation flow chart illustrating the first andthe second embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 7 shows an operation flow chart illustrating a fourth embodiment ofthe present invention; and

FIG. 8 shows an operation flow chart illustrating a fifth embodiment ofthe present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

A data storage according to each embodiment of the present inventionincludes, as shown in FIG. 1, a data storage part 2 storing informationto be protected and a functioning part 1 functioning on the storing part1.

When the data storage is handled in a predetermined manner, i.e., when,for example, a semiconductor storage as the data storage is removed froma printed substrate without a special concern, or so, the functioningpart 1 responds thereto to function on the data storage part 2 for apredetermined effect.

The predetermined effect may be one of automatically erasing,destroying, or replacing stored data in the data storage part 2, forexample.

That is, an embodiment of the present invention is a semiconductorintegrated circuit having a nonvolatile memory configured in such amanner that, when the nonvolatile memory as the data storage part 2storing information to be protected is removed for an illegal purpose,or illegal reading out of the stored information is attempted, thestored data automatically enters a state such that reading out thereofis not allowed, or further, the stored data is automatically replacedwith other predetermined data.

Further, it is preferable that the above-mentioned other predetermineddata with which the original information is thus replaced is connectedto a communication function, a notification function or such. Thereby, apredetermined external organization can be automatically notified of anoccurrence of such an illegal action.

According to a first mode of carrying out the present invention, awindow or an opening is provided on, for example, a bottom of a packageof a nonvolatile memory, that is, a so-called a memory with a window,described later, is realized. As a result, when the package of thenonvolatile memory is mounted on a printed substrate in such a mannerthat the bottom thereof is covered by a surface of the printedsubstrate, the window or the opening provided thereto is blockedthereby, and thus, the window or the opening is prevented from beingexposed to outside light.

On the other hand, when this package of the nonvolatile memory isremoved from the printed substrate without any special concern, thewindow or the opening, provided to the bottom thereof, is exposed tooutside light accordingly. As a result, the nonvolatile memory, insidethe package, is exposed to outside light via the window or the opening.Then, energy of the outside light functions to the nonvolatile memory toautomatically erase the stored data.

In order to achieve this function, such an amount of hot carriers arepreviously injected in the nonvolatile memory that, even slight exposureof the nonvolatile memory to outside light may cause erasure of thestored data, while the hot carriers should not influence a regular useof a memory cell included in the nonvolatile memory.

Technology (so-called UV-EPROM) of causing data erasure in such anonvolatile memory due to ultraviolet irradiation is known. In order tocause the same effect even with ordinary light other than ultravioletray, a predetermined amount of hot carriers are previously injected asmentioned above.

Technology of data erasure with the use of hot carriers is mentioned,for example, by ‘a hot carrier mechanism is applied to an erasuremethod, . . . ’ in an item ‘(2) for employment of low cost flash memoryprocess technology’ in ‘for development of ‘World’s first 32-bitRISC-type microcontroller having a flash memory built therein’, by NECELECTRONICS, NEC, Mar. 12, 1996 (URL:http://www.nec.co.jp/press/ja/9603/1202.html, Oct. 4, 2005).

Further, technology for reducing an write/erase operation voltage andachieving high speed operation by employing hot carriers is mentioned inan item of ‘principle and configuration of MONOS’ in a column of ‘spacetraveling device, low-cost mixing-use nonvolatile memory devicetechnology “MONOS”’ by SONY (URL:http://www.sony.co.jp/Products/SC-HP/cx_pal/vo152/pdf/monos_f.pdf, Oct.4, 2005).

From these known technologies, it is seen that a voltage required fordriving electrons can be reduced with the use of hot carriers, andthereby, electrons even can be driven even with low energy. That is, itis seen that, by injecting hot carriers in a semiconductor memory,energy required for erasing data can be reduced.

Further, as described in an item of ‘UV-EPROM (ultraviolet erasablePROM)’ of a column ‘EPROM, from: free encyclopedia “Wikipedia”’ (URL:http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPROM: Oct. 4, 2005), technology ofachieving data erasure by exciting electrons with ultravioletirradiation so that they may penetrate a gate insulating film is known.

In the first mode of carrying out the present invention, this technologyis applicable, and, in order to achieve data erasure in a semiconductormemory even with ordinary outside light other than ultraviolet ray, hotcarriers are injected, and thus, energy required for driving electronscan be reduced.

That is, in order to achieve data erasure thanks to outside lightirradiation due to an effect the same as that of the well-known dataerasure mechanism in an UV-EPROM, a configuration should be providedsuch that electrons excited by outside light can easily penetrate a gateinsulating film of a semiconductor memory. For this purpose, hotcarriers, having an effect of easily driving electrons as mentionedabove, are injected. That is, the effect of reducing energy required fordriving electrons in a semiconductor memory by injecting hot carriersmentioned above is utilized. As a result, a semiconductor memory forwhich stored data can be erased when the memory is exposed to ordinaryoutside light other than ultraviolet ray can be obtained.

Especially, as will be descried later for a third embodiment, in thefirst mode of carrying out the present invention, a so-called memorywith a window, the same as the above-mentioned well-known UV-EPROM, isapplied. A configuration of this ‘memory with a window’ is described as‘a quartz glass made window is provided to a package of an UV-EPROM forapplying ultraviolet ray’ in a column ‘UV-EPROM (ultraviolet erasablePROM)’ of the above-mentioned column ‘EPROM, from: free encyclopedia“Wikipedia”’ (URL: http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPROM: Oct. 4, 2005).

Next, a data storage in a second mode of carrying out the presentinvention is described now.

In the second mode of carrying out the present invention, as shown inFIG. 2(a), other than an address terminal Al for reading data, apredetermined connection monitor terminal TS is additionally provided toa data storage. Then, in a process where the data storage is mounted ona printed substrate, a solder bridge is produced for short-circuitingbetween the address terminal A1 and the connection monitor terminal TS.

The above-mentioned connection monitor terminal TS may be provided foreach of respective address terminals, or, may be provided only for partof the address terminals.

For example, in a case of a BGA-type semiconductor device package, sucha circuit short-circuited by means of a solder bridge cannot easily befound out by a third person. Therefore, when the third person attemptsto remove this package from the printed substrate by melting solder,which connects terminals between the data storage and the printedsubstrate, without any special concern, the above-mentioned solderbridge connecting between the address terminal A1 and the connectionmonitor terminal TS is also removed accordingly without causing anynotice by this person.

Thus, even when an unauthorized third person removes the data storagefrom the printed substrate for the purpose of illegal use or such, thisperson may, with a high possibility, remove the solder bridgeshort-circuiting the address terminal A1 and the connection monitorterminal TS unconsciously as the same time the person removes solderconnecting a number of terminals connecting terminals between thesemiconductor device as the data storage and the printed substrate.

It is noted that, as a part of a circuit configuration of the datastorage, a table is provided, which is selected from a result ofexclusive OR (EXOR) operation carried out between the above-mentionedspecific address terminal A1 and the connection monitor terminal TS,and, by means of this table, proper addressing for reading data is made.As a result, as long as the address terminal A1 and the connectionmonitor terminal TS are short-circuited, these two terminals have equalsignal levels, and thus, the exclusive OR operation therebetween resultsin an L level. The circuit configuration should be made such that, thetable selected by this L level signal provides proper addressing.

On the other hand, when the short circuit bridge between these terminalsA1 and TS is removed, they may have mutually different signal levels. Asa result, the exclusive OR operation therebetween results in an H level.Another table may be selected from this H level signal preferably. Bythis other table, predetermined addressing other than the properaddressing may be carried out, whereby data different from proper datamay be read out.

That is, as shown in FIG. 2(b), when both terminals A1 and TS areshort-circuited to have equal levels, an output L of an exclusive ORdevice 300 is inverted into an H level by an inverting function, and asa result, proper addressing is provided, whereby proper data is read outfrom a proper data storage part 100.

On the other hand, when the short circuit bridge between the terminalsA1 and TS is removed, that is, when the data storage is removed from theprinted substrate without a special concern for the purpose of illegaluse or such, an output H of the exclusive OR device 300 is obtained andit is then inverted into an L level by the inverting function, wherebydata (dummy data) is read out from a fraud detection data storage part200 through addressing carried out in a manner different from the properone.

As mentioned above, according to the second mode of carrying out thepresent invention, from the above-mentioned predetermined addressing(caused by the above-mentioned removal of the short circuit bridge)other than the proper addressing, predetermined dummy data is read out.Instead, a predetermined program may be executed as a result of thepredetermined dummy data is read out. As a result, a control system of ageneral-purpose personal computer or such, which is applied by a thirdperson to read data from the target data storage, may be controlled bythis program or the dummy data itself. As a result, via a communicationnetwork such as the Internet, a notification signal is automaticallygenerated for a predetermined organization. Then, this fact that thedummy data or the predetermined program has been thus read out isnotified of to the predetermined organization as information ofnotifying that illegal reading or illegal use of information to beprotected is thus executed, whereby the predetermined organization maytake appropriate measures.

Further, a configuration may be made by which, the predetermined data(dummy data) read instead of the proper data from the addressingdifferent from the proper addressing as mentioned above controls thecontrol system of the general-purpose personal computer or such, whichis applied by the third person to read data from the target datastorage, whereby a caution message is displayed for this person who iscarrying out the illegal reading or illegal use of the information to beprotected from the target data storage.

Further, another configuration may be made by which, meaningless data isset, which imitates the proper data, to be read out, instead of theproper data from the predetermined addressing other than the properaddressing as mentioned above. Thereby, when the information isillegally used, a proper result cannot be obtained. Then, a furtherconfiguration may be made by which, this fact that the proper resultcannot be obtained is detected externally. For example, for a case wherethe information to be protected includes fingerprint information or suchfor personal authentication, a configuration may be made by which, whenan unauthorized third person obtains this information illegally andintends to apply it for illegal authentication, false and imitatingauthentication information (dummy data) is read out by theabove-mentioned predetermined addressing other than the properaddressing. As a result, this unauthorized person cannot succeed inauthentication, and this fact may be detected by an authenticationorganization, and as a result, the illegal use of the information to beprotected may be detected.

It is noted that, in each of the above-described first and second modesof carrying out the present invention, all of the information to beprotected should not necessarily be erased or replaced. That is, evenwhen merely part of the information to be protected is be erased,destroyed or replaced, a purpose of preventing leakage of theinformation to be protected may be sufficiently achieved for some cases.

According to the above-mentioned respective modes of carrying out thepresent invention, since information to be protected is appropriatelyerased, destroyed or replaced as mentioned above, the information to beprotected can be positively protected. As a result, leakage thereof canbe positively prevented accordingly.

Furthermore, in each method according to the present invention describedabove, merely information to be protected is erased, destroyed orreplaced. However, the data storage itself, as hardware, is not damagedat all. Accordingly, the data storage itself may be reused. Thus, thepresent invention is advantageous also in a resource conservationviewpoint.

Specific embodiments of the present invention will now be described.

FIG. 3 shows a circuit diagram of a data storage in a first embodimentof the present invention.

As shown, the data storage includes an address decoder 50 responding toan address signal to provide a reading signal to a memory cell 110 or adummy memory cell 210; the memory cell 110 storing proper data; thedummy memory cell 210 storing dummy data different from the proper data;an EXOR device 300 with an inverting function to carry out exclusive-oroperation between signals on the address terminal A1 and the connectionmonitor terminal TS, and outputting an operation result after invertingwith the inverting function; a gate device 120 passing the proper readdata from the memory cell 110 in response to an H level output of theEXOR 300 with the inverting function; a gate device 220 passing thedummy read data from the dummy memory cell 210 in response to an H levelsignal inverted by an inverter 230 from an L level output of the EXOR300 with the inverting function; and the inverter 230.

In the circuit configuration of FIG. 3, the same as in the case of thesecond mode of carrying out the present invention described above withreference to FIG. 2, both inputs of the EXOR device 300 with theinverting function have the same level in a state in which the addressterminal A1 and the connection monitor terminal TS are short-circuited,i.e., in the proper mounted state, the EXOR device 300 with theinverting function outputs an H level. Thereby, the gate device 120enters a pas-sing state, while the gate device 220 responds to an Llevel inverted from the above-mentioned H level by the inverter 230enters a blocking state. As a result, the proper data is read out fromthe memory cell 110.

On the other hand, when the short circuit bridge between the addressterminal A1 and the connection monitor terminal TS is removed due to acause that the data storage is removed from the printed substrate orsuch, as mentioned above for the second mode of carrying out the presentinvention, both inputs of the EXOR device 300 with the invertingfunction have different levels. As a result, the EXOR device 300 withthe inverting function outputs an L level. Thereby, the gate device 120enters a blocking state, while the gate device 220 responds to an Hlevel inverted from the above-mentioned L level output enters a passingstate. As a result, the dummy data is read out from the memory cell 210.

This dummy data is, as mentioned above, includes information forinitiating automatic notifying operation for notifying the predeterminedorganization, information for initiating displaying operation fordisplaying a caution message to an operator, false and imitatingauthentication information or such.

FIG. 4 shows a circuit diagram of a data storage in a second embodimentof the above-described first embodiment.

Since the second embodiment has approximately the same configuration asthat of the first embodiment described above with reference to FIG. 3,duplicate description is omitted.

The second embodiment is different from the first embodiment in that adummy data generating part 210A is provided instead of the dummy memorycell 210. The dummy data generating part 210A is a circuit forgenerating predetermined data. Specifically, each predetermined fixedsignal level is generated from a connection to the ground, a connectionto the power supply line, or such.

In this configuration of the second embodiment, when the short-circuitbridge between the address terminal A1 and the connection monitorterminal TS is removed due to a removal of the data storage for anillegal purpose or such, the L level output of the EXOR device 300 withthe inverting function is inverted by the inverter 230, and the H levelsignal thus obtained causes the gate device 220 to enter the passingstate, whereby a signal having the above-mentioned fixed signal level isread out from the dummy data generating part 210A.

FIG. 5 shows a flow chart illustrating a work and operation flow of athird embodiment corresponding to the above-described first mode ofcarrying out the present invention.

In the flow chart of FIG. 5, in Step S1, a memory with a window, inwhich a predetermined amount of hot carriers are previously injected asmentioned above, is mounted on a printed substrate in such a manner thatthe window is covered by the printed substrate. This memory with thewindow has a configuration such that a memory chip is covered by apackage having a window, and, when the memory chip inside the package isexposed to outside light via the window, stored data in the memory chipis erased due to the function of the above-mentioned hot carriers.

In Step S2, in this state, predetermined information to be protected iswritten in the memory chip. Alternatively, the predetermined informationto be protected is written in the memory in a state in which the windowis covered, and after that, the memory is mounted on the printedsubstrate in such a manner that the window is covered as mentioned aboveso that the memory chip inside of the package is prevented from beingexposed via the window.

In Step S3, when unexpected removal of the memory with the windowoccurs, that is, when the memory with the window is removed without sucha special concern that the window is prevented from being uncovered, thestored data is destroyed as a result of the inside memory chip beingexposed to outside light in Step S4. That is, the window of the packageof the memory with the window is thus uncovered, whereby the memoryinside the package is exposed to outside light, and the stored data inthe memory chip is destroyed due to the function of the hot carriersinjected therein as mentioned above.

As a result, leakage of the information to be protected can bepositively prevented even when the data storage is thus illegallyremoved.

FIG. 6 shows a flow chart illustrating a work and operation flow of thefirst and second embodiments, described above with reference to FIGS. 3and 4, corresponding to the above-described second mode of carrying outthe present invention.

In FIG. 6, in Step S11, a data storage having a circuit configurationsuch as that shown in FIG. 3 or 4 is provided. In Step S12, when thedata storage is mounted on a printed substrate, an address terminal A1and a connection monitor terminal TS are short-circuited by a solderbridge.

In Step S13, in this state, information to be protected is written in amemory cell 110 of the data storage. In this state in which bothterminals A1 and TS are thus short-circuited, only the gate device 120enters the passing state as described above. As a result, the properdata (information to be protected), written in Step S13 as mentionedabove, can be read from the memory cell 110 in Step S14.

In Step S15, when unexpected removal of the data storage from theprinted substrate occurs, i.e., when solder connection, including theabove-mentioned solder bridge short-circuiting the above-mentionedterminals A1 and TS, is removed and thus the data storage is removedfrom the printed substrate, the solder bridge is removed accordingly inStep S16.

As a result, only the gate device 220 enters the passing state asmentioned above since the short circuit between the terminals A1 and TSis thus removed, whereby both terminals may have different signallevels. Thereby, instead of the proper data, dummy data stored in thedummy memory cell 210 or fixed data generated by the dummy datagenerating part 210A is read out.

Thus, leakage of the information to be protected can be positivelyprevented even when the data storage is thus illegally removed.

FIG. 7 shows a flow chart illustrating an operation flow of a fourthembodiment of the present invention.

The fourth embodiment is a variant embodiment of the first or the secondembodiment described above with reference to FIGS. 3 or 4 of the presentinvention, providing a configuration by which dummy data read from thedummy memory cell 210 in the first embodiment or read from the dummydata generating part 210A in the second embodiment provides a specificfunction.

In Step S21 of FIG. 7, predetermined dummy data, different from properdata, is read out from the dummy memory cell 210 or from the dummy datagenerating part 210A of a target data storage in Step S17 of FIG. 6 asmentioned above. By a function of this dummy data, a control system ofan apparatus, for example, a personal computer, which is operated by anunauthorized person for actually reading data from the target datastorage, is automatically controlled. As a result, this apparatusautomatically transmits a predetermined notification for a predetermineddestination via a communication network such as the Internet in StepS22. As a result, the fact that the target data storage is thus usedillegally by the unauthorized person can be found out.

FIG. 8 shows a flow chart illustrating an operation flow of a fifthembodiment of the present invention.

The fifth embodiment is another variant embodiment of the first or thesecond embodiment described above with reference to FIGS. 3 or 4 of thepresent invention, providing another configuration by which dummy dataread from the dummy memory cell 210 in the first embodiment or from thedummy data generating part 210A in the second embodiment providesanother specific function.

In FIG. 8, in Step S31, predetermined dummy data, different from properdata, is read out from the dummy memory cell 210 or from the dummy datagenerating part 210A of a target data storage in Step S17 of FIG. 6 asmentioned above. A case will now be assumed where the proper data storedin the target data storage is authentication information, and, anunauthorized person who does not recognize that the data he or,she thusobtains from the target data storage illegally is not the properauthentication information but dummy data.

In this case, in Step S32, when the unauthorized person actually appliesthis dummy data to obtain an authentication from a predeterminedauthentication apparatus, the authentication apparatus does not makeproper authentication since the dumpy data is applied thereto asmentioned above. It is noted that the dummy data is configured so thatthe authentication apparatus which thus processes the dummy data candetect the fact that the illegal operation is thus made. As a result,the fact that the target data storage is thus used illegally by theunauthorized person can be found out.

Further, the present invention is not limited to the above-describedembodiments, and variations and modifications may be made withoutdeparting from the basic concept of the present invention claimed below.

The present application is based on Japanese Priority Application No.2005-299201, filed on Oct. 13, 2005, the entire contents of which arehereby incorporated herein by reference.

1. A data storage comprising a semiconductor storage in which hotcarriers are injected in such a manner that stored data is erased whensaid semiconductor storage is handled in a predetermined manner.
 2. Thedata storage as claimed in claim 1, wherein: a housing is provided whichhas an opening for exposure of the semiconductor storage to outsidelight; said semiconductor storage is configured in such a manner thatsaid opening is blocked when the semiconductor storage is set in aproper state; and when the semiconductor storage is removed from theproper state, said opening is exposed, so that the semiconductor storageis exposed to outside light, and the stored data is erased due to afunction of the hot carriers.
 3. A data storage comprising a part offunctioning to respond to data reading operation carried out on astorage part storing data to cause predetermined data, different fromtarget data, to be read out instead of the target data.
 4. The datastorage as claimed in claim 3, wherein: said part, functioning torespond to data reading operation carried out on the storage partstoring data for a case where said data storage is handled in apredetermined manner to cause predetermined data different from targetdata to be read out instead of the target data, is configured such thatsaid part causes addressing in a predetermined manner different from aproper manner when said data storage is handled in said predeterminedmanner, upon addressing said storage part.
 5. The data storage asclaimed in claim 4, wherein: predetermined external terminals arepreviously short-circuited, and a configuration is provided such thatthe short circuit of the predetermined external terminals is removedwhen the data storage is handled in said predetermined manner, and saidpart, which causes addressing in a predetermined manner different fromthe proper manner when said data storage is handled in saidpredetermined manner, carries out the proper addressing when saidpredetermined external terminals are short-circuited while carrying outthe predetermined addressing different from the proper addressing whensaid short-circuit is removed.
 6. The data storage as claimed in claim3, wherein: said predetermined data to be read out instead of the targetdata comprises information for automatically initiating predeterminedcommunication operation for notification.
 7. The data storage as claimedin claim 3, wherein: said predetermined data read out instead of thetarget data is configured in such a manner that, when said predetermineddata is thus read out and then is actually used, this use is detected.